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MYTholoGY oF ThE laW and JUSTICE 
ParTY’S MIGraTIon dISCoUrSE1
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the deconstruction of the migration 
discourse of the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), looking 
for mythical structures in it and trying to decode them using discourse analy-
sis. When it comes to migration politics, Poland is one of the most curious and 
ambiguous contemporary cases. Previously predominantly a sending country, as 
its economy grows Poland is becoming a receiving country, faced with millions 
of incoming labour migrants. The Polish government lets them in, despite be-
ing anti-migrant in its rhetoric, especially when it comes to relocation of refu-
gees within the European Union (EU). Some surveys reveal that countrywide 
anti-migrant sentiment is a rather new development: Polish attitudes towards 
immigrants have worsened since mid-2015, that is since the so-called European 
migration crisis was utilized by Law and Justice in their campaign at the 2015 
Polish parliamentary election in order to gain fear-induced support.2 Therefore, 
Law and Justice’s migration discourse is fundamental to the study of contem-
porary Polish migration politics.I have analysed the news, interviews and oth-
er publications from the official website of the Law and Justice party (pis.org.
pl) over a period between June 2015 and July 2018. Based upon E. Cassirer’s, 
M.  Eliade’s and H. Tudor’s understanding of political myth, I have identified 
a number of repetitive mythical structures and characteristics of political myths 
in the Law and Justice’s discourse on migration that can help to better under-
stand Law and Justice’s political and ideological stances.
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1 This research is part of a project that has received funding fromthe European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 765224.
2 B. Łaciak, J. Segeš Frelak, The Wages of Fear. Attitudes towards Refugees and Migrants in Poland, War-
saw 2018, p. 10.
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We should carefully study the origin, the structure, the methods, and the tech-
nique of the political myths. We should see the adversary face to face in order to 
know how to combat him.
Ernst Cassirer, The myth of the state
InTrodUCTIon
When it comes to migration politics, Poland is one of the most curious and ambiguous 
contemporary cases. Previously predominantly a sending country, as its economy grows 
Poland is becoming a receiving country3, faced with millions of incoming labour mi-
grants4, whom the Polish government lets in despite being anti-migrant in its rhetoric 
especially when it comes to relocation of refugees within the European Union (EU).5 
The Independent has listed Poland among the most anti-migrant countries in Europe,6 
and surveys show that Poles would leave the EU if this were necessary to ensure that 
Muslim refugees do not settle in Poland.7 At the same time, millions of Poles work in 
other EU countries,8 benefitting from the free movement of people. Moreover, during 
WWII Poles themselves were asylum seekers escaping, among others, to the Middle 
East,9 and Poland has been home to Muslim minorities for centuries (the Tatar Poles).10 
Indeed, surveys show that countrywide anti-migrant sentiment is a rather new devel-
opment: Polish attitudes towards immigrants have worsened since mid-2015, since the 
3 K. Łukasiewicz, “Strategies of Reconstructing Islam in Exile. A Case of Chechens in Poland”, in 
K. Górak-Sosnowska, Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on 
Islam, Warsaw 2011, p. 89. 
4 “More than 2 Million Ukrainians Working in Poland, Says Polish-Ukrainian Economic Chamber”, 
Kiyv Post, 25 April 2018, at <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/2-mln-ukrainians-work-
ing-poland-says-polish-ukrainian-economic-chamber.html>.
5 J. Cienski, “Why Poland Doesn’t Want Refugees. An Ethnically Homogenous Nation Battles EU Ef-
forts to Distribute Asylum Seekers”, Politico, 21 May 2017, at <https://www.politico.eu/article/poli-
tics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/>.
6 S. Osborne, “The most Anti-Immigrant Countries in Europe”, The Independent, 7 December 2016, 
at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/europe-immigration-most-anti-immigrant- 
countries-italy-france-germany-uk-a7460301.html>. 
7 M. Strzelecki, “Poles Value Denying Muslim Refugees over Being in the EU, Poll Shows”, Bloomberg, 
5  July 2017, at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-05/most-poles-prefer-ban-
ning-muslims-to-eu-membership-poll-shows>.
8 “Number of EU citizens that are usual residents in the rest of the EU as of 1 January 2017, EU-28 
(million)”, Eurostat, 2018, at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=-
File:Number_of_EU_citizens_that_are_usual_residents_in_the_rest_of_the_EU_as_of_1_Janu 
ary_2017,_EU-28_(million).png>.
9 E. Stańczyk, “Exilic Childhood in Very Foreign Lands: Memoirs of Polish Refugees in World War II”, 
Journal of War & Culture Studies, vol. 11, no. 2 (2018), pp. 136-149. 
10 T. Marciniak, “A Survey of Muslim Minorities in Poland”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 17, 
no. 2 (1997), pp. 353-359. 
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so-called European migration crisis was utilized by the Law and Justice party (Prawo 
I Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in their 2015 Polish parliamentary election campaign in order 
to gain fear-induced support.11 Therefore, PiS migration discourse is fundamental to 
the study of contemporary Polish migration politics. According to one of the founders 
of research into political myths, Ernst Cassirer, instability as a state of mind, a crisis, can 
be crafted. This state of mind is a fertile ground for acceptance of myth, which can be 
a very effective tool of social manipulation.12 The European migration crisis is an exam-
ple of such a moment of instability.
One of the central features of myth is its appeal to emotions, and appeal to emo-
tions is a tool widely used in populist politics.13 14 According to José Pedro Zúquete, 
populists, which include PiS,15 also often resort to missionary politics. This is a cluster 
concept that he defines as a political religion, characterized by the dynamic interaction 
among charismatic leadership, a narrative of salvation, outsiderhood and ritualization, 
and the creation of a moral community invested with a collective mission of combating 
conspiratorial enemies and redeeming the nation from its putative crisis.16 For this, my-
thologies of the strong state, the home of a blameless, pure nation are often invoked.17 
Therefore, myth is a useful analytical lens for the study of populist politics. The aim 
of this paper is to contribute to the deconstruction of the migration discourse of PiS, 
looking for mythical structures in it and trying to decode them using basic discourse 
analysis.
ThEorY
The word “myth” comes from the Greek mythos which originally meant “word, 
speech”.18 It then gained secondary meanings, such as “public speech”, “dialogue, con-
versation” or “tale, narration”.19
Scientific conceptualisation of myth as a political tool started in the 20th centu-
ry, first by Mircea Eliade, then by Ernst Cassirer and Leszek Kołakowski. Afterwards, 
Henry Tudor defined the concept of political myth.
11 B. Łaciak, J. Segeš Frelak, The Wages of Fear…, p. 10.
12 E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Garden City, N.Y. 1955.
13 K. Wahl-Jorgensen, “Media Coverage of Shifting Emotional Regimes: Donald Trump’s Angry Popu-
lism”, Media, Culture & Society, vol. 40, no. 5 (2018), pp. 766-778. 
14 R. Wodak, The Politics of Fear. What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, Los Angeles 2015.
15 M. Rooduijn et al., The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties 
in Europe, 2019, at <http://www.popu-list.org>.
16 J.P. Zúquete, “Missionary Politics – A Contribution to the Study of Populism”, Religion Compass, 
vol. 7, no. 7 (2013), p. 264. 
17 J. Kubik, FATIGUE : What Is It All About? A Programmatic Statement, 2018.
18 C. Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth, Cambridge 2007, p. 20. 
19 H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, J.H. Stuart, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford 1968, p. 1151. 
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Cassirer focused on the philosophy of cognition, the way of understanding and 
interpreting reality. He viewed human culture as a world of “symbolic forms”: lan-
guage, history, art, science and myth. Those five symbolic forms are our lenses for 
interpretation of reality. Looking for structures in those human activities, he stud-
ied myth as a form of consciousness, a form of cognition (a way of thinking), which 
is different from scientific cognition, but not necessarily wrong or false, as positiv-
ists have argued.20 If something is not empirically verifiable, however, it is a myth. 
The mythical way of thinking can be either spontaneous or crafted. Cassirer noted 
that in the 20th century, with the help of new technical tools, old ideas have been 
changed into the strong and powerful political weapons that myths are.21 He found 
myth made according to plan. The new political myths do not grow up freely; they are 
not wild fruits of an exuberant imagination. They are artificial things fabricated by 
very skilful and cunning artisans.22 He states that the technological age has enabled 
a new technique of mythmaking, thanks to which myths can be manufactured in the 
same sense and according to the same methods as any other modem weapon… That is 
a new thing and a thing of crucial importance. It has changed the whole form of our so-
cial life… The first step that had to be taken was a change in the function of language. 
If we study the development of human speech we find that in the history of civilization 
the word fulfils two entirely different functions. To put it briefly we may term these func-
tions the semantic and the magical use of the word… the magic word has a predominant 
and overwhelming influence. It does not describe things or relations of things; it tries to 
produce effects and to change the course of nature.23 Cassirer said that language, along 
with ritual, is a tool of creating mythological thinking. As for language, he said new, 
performative language, rather than descriptive, is created, or old words are given new 
meaning. This language allows one to create labels, and thereby control people’s real-
ity through controlling their emotions. Hence, while studying myth we need to first 
and foremost look at the language.
Cassirer also said that the mythological mode of thinking usually appears in mo-
ments of instability, in crises. Therefore, it only makes sense that the so-called Euro-
pean refugee crisis has spurred multiple mythologies concerning migrants. Moreover, 
Cassirer notes that instability as a state of mind can be crafted, artificially created, and 
consequently myth can be a very effective tool of social manipulation.
Eliade understood myth as a sacred story. While he was also interested in the con-
cept of homo symbolicus, he focused more on homo religiosus. Thus, he studied con-
crete religious myths in order to understand the structures of mythical thinking. He 
believed that myths can transform, but it is structure that allows myth to survive. These 
structures are derived from the religious, but exist in our world on their own, detached 
from religion, but omnipresent in literature, cinema and politics. For Eliade, myth was 
20 C. Bottici, A Philosophy…
21 E. Cassirer, The Myth of…, p. 277.
22 Ibid., p. 282.
23 Ibid. 
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a way of transcending objective human existence through introducing the concept of 
“sacrum” to it.24 25
Leszek Kołakowski was close to Eliade in his understanding of myth, as he treated it 
as a way of transcending empirical human experience by giving it a meaning that went be-
yond empirical reality through relativization.26 He saw myth as a type of religious belief, 
and as a conviction and a philosophical theory, which saw the fulfilment of transhistori-
cal values in the reality of human culture.27 He saw understanding of empirical realities 
as meaningful to a mythical organisation of the world, which is permanently present in 
cultures. His view of a myth can be briefly summarised as the meaning-giving interpreta-
tion of reality. Importantly, he noted that the predicates “true” and “false” are inapplica-
ble here, similar to Cassirer’s understanding. What he viewed important is not matching 
a judgement with a situation it describes but matching a need with an area which satisfies it.28
Henry Tudor defined political myths as ideological narratives, believed by social 
groups to be true even when they may be false, devices with dramatic constructions that 
are used to “come to grips with reality”. Political myth for him is a kind of myth that 
deals with political topics. Its major characteristic is that is always uses a certain group 
of people as the hero or protagonist.29
For this paper, since I analyse discourse of a political party on a concrete politicised 
topic, I adopt Tudor’s definition of a political myth, informed by Cassirer’s and Eliade’s 
understandings of myth, and to a lesser extent by Kołakowski’s. This is because both 
Cassirer and Eliade, in spite of differences in what they focus on, see myth as a special 
form of thinking and as an expression of collective emotions, and both were interested 
in myth in political thinking.30 31 32
I leave aside scholars who understand myth as a story produced by primitive socie-
ties, such as Levi-Strauss, or myth as a false notion of reality, such as Barthes, and others, 
as they do not fully fit the chosen research focus.
Therefore, I see political myths as (ideologically infused) convictions, visions and be-
liefs constructed in the consciousness and cognition of a community in reply to a strong 
emotional need, and which appeal to layers of consciousness beyond rationality, and the 
purpose of which is to provide a meaningful interpretation of empirical reality.
Cassirer identified five attributes of a myth: 1) mythical identity (no difference be-
tween the real and the ideal, the object and its representation, between the thought and 
24 C. Bottici, A Philospophy….
25 M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature of Religion, transl. by W.R. Trask, New York 1961.
26 L. Kołakowski, A. Czerniawski, The Presence of Myth, Chicago 1989, p. 2. 
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 3. 
29 H. Tudor, Political Myth, London 1972.
30 E. Cassirer, The Myth of…
31 M. Eliade, Cosmos and History. The Myth of the Eternal Return, transl. by W.R. Trask, New York 1954.
32 B. Törnquist Plewa, The Wheel of Polish Fortune. Myths in Polish Collective Consciousness during the 
First Years of Solidarity, Lund 1992.
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the being); 2) lack of distinction between the part and the whole (an attribute is identi-
cal to the whole); 3) causality fallacy (anything that happened before will happen again, 
allowing the building of prophecies); 4) organisation of time and space is different than 
in science (in illo tempore); 5) numbers have more than empirical values.33
Barbara Törnquist Plewa has identified the following distinctive features of 
a myth, bringing together the understanding of the major authors, Eliade, Cas sirer 
and Kołakowski: emotional bias, transhistoricity, the capacity to transcend hu-
man empirical experience, and the two-value division of the world into sacrum and 
profanum.34
Among those features, the most fundamental is emotional bias, the emotional need 
which creates a myth. If a myth reflects a truth, it is primarily a truth of emotions. A real 
myth can never be a pure intellectual creation, a living myth must be expressed emotional-
ly.35 At the same time, a myth is not a bare emotion, it is an expression of collective emo-
tion. To become a myth, an emotion must find its expression in either a visual or a ver-
bal form through symbolic manifestations. Expression is as important as emotion.36 For 
this paper, I will focus on verbal manifestations of myths, on the language used to create 
them. I am, however, aware that language can never render the totality of emotions that 
generate a myth, which creates a limitation for such research.
Thanks to its transhistoricity, a myth legitimises contemporary action through link-
ing it with the past.37
The two-value division of the world into sacrum and profanum is also particularly 
important to characterise a myth. This can apply to time, space, numbers, objects, val-
ues, etc.38
All these features are intertwined in the structure of a myth, however most im-
portant is that as long as there are irrational or emotional elements, there are traces of 
myth.39 After Kołakowski, as long as something in reality has a sense, a higher purpose, 
meaning, is ascribed values, it has traces of myth. Myth can explain anything. An over-
all function of myth can be summarised after Cassirer as to control people’s reality, or 
after Kołakowski, to give meaning to it.
analYSIS
I have analysed the news, interviews and other publications from the official website of 
the Law and Justice Party (pis.org.pl). The research sample was selected by search of the 
33 E. Cassirer, The Myth of…
34 B. Törnquist Plewa, The Wheel of Polish Fortune…, p. 13.
35 C. Bottici, A Philosophy…
36 Ibid.
37 B. Törnquist Plewa, The Wheel of Polish Fortune…, p. 14.
38 H. Buczyńska, Cassirer, Warszawa 1963, pp. 91-94.
39 B. Törnquist Plewa, The Wheel of Polish Fortune…, p. 14. 
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keywords ‘refugee’ (50 articles identified) and ‘migrant’ (33 articles identified).40 Most 
of those results overlap. The earliest publication dates back to June 2015 and the latest 
to July 2018. The research was conducted in January 2019.
The result was curious because nowhere in the analysed material was there a men-
tion of Chechen refugees, which are the biggest group among the refugees accepted in 
Poland, and the biggest group among applicants for asylum.41 Neither were Ukrainian 
migrants mentioned, even though in talks with the EU the Polish government some-
times uses them as an excuse of having already accepted a large number of refugees.42 
Neither is there a mention of new plans to welcome economic migrants from Vietnam 
and the Philippines.43
The analysis has revealed an overwhelming appeal to emotion, and very little ap-
peal to rationality throughout the discourse. There are no arguments given against ac-
cepting refugees, such as potential negative economic effects, integration difficulties 
due to lack of proficiency in Polish or cultural and religious otherness. The only argu-
ment overwhelmingly used is that of security, which proves that migration in Poland 
is a largely securitised issue, meaning a manufactured perceived existential threat.44 Re-
garding the refusal to accept EU refugee relocation quotas, it is repeated many times 
that what is most important is the security of Poland and Poles.45
As explanation for this reasoning, terror attacks in Western European countries are 
cited. For example: After recent events related to acts of terror, we will not accept refugees, 
because there is no mechanism which would ensure security.46
Here we can notice the fallacy of causality, identified by Cassirer as one of the 
characteristics of myth. The terror attacks to which Jarosław Kaczyński refers in this 
statement, (quote from a Q&A session with Kaczyński in May, 2016), are presumably 
the bombings in Brussels which had happened two months earlier. Naturally, there is 
no way to empirically prove that an attack in Belgium by Belgian nationals (and one 
40 Since the website is in Polish, so was the search, accounting for all possible grammatical forms of the 
nouns. All original text is in Polish, all translation is own.
41 The Head of the Office for Foreigners, Information of the Head of the Office for Foreigners on im-
plementation of the Act of 13 June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the 
Republic of Poland (uniform text in Journal of Law of 2016, item 1836) in the scope of perfo, Warsaw 
2018, p. 39.
42 “Poland Refuses Middle Eastern Migrants”, Euronews, 2 January 2018, at <https://www.euronews.
com/2018/01/02/poland-refuses-mid-east-migrants>.
43 G. Osiecki, “Rząd otwiera się na imigrantów. Cudzoziemcy pomogą nam załatać demograficzną 
dziurę?” [The government is opening up to immigrants. Will foreigners help us patch the demo-
graphic hole?], Gazeta Prawna.pl, 4 June 2018, at <https://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/praca-i-ka 
riera/artykuly/1127723,zmiany-w-zatrudnianiu-cudzoziemcow-imigranci-bez-pozwolen-na- 
prace.html>.
44 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, London 1998.
45 Retrieved from: “Najważniejsze jest bezpieczeństwo”, PiS, 23 November 2015, at <http://pis.org.pl/
aktualnosci/najwazniejsze-jest-bezpieczenstwo>.
46 Retrieved from: “Q&A z Prezesem PiS Jarosławem Kaczyńskim”, PiS, 7 May 2016, at <http://pis.org.
pl/aktualnosci/q-a-z-prezesem-pis-jaroslawem-kaczynskim>. 
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Swedish national) loyal to the Islamic state could in any way cause attacks in Poland by 
Syrian refugees.47 48
However, the dominant myth in the discourse is an “us vs them” way of thinking, 
where “us” or “self ” is the PiS government, by extension Poland, and the extended 
self 49 50 is the four Visegrad countries (V4), sometimes the wider Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE) or new EU Member States who struggle against the older Mem-
ber States, Western European countries, and the “Brussels elites” who are perceived as 
protecting their interests at the cost of the new members. The reference to V4 and the 
CEE suggests the hierarchy of PiS self-identification, which fits into a model of nested 
identities – a hierarchal form where national identification is nested in a regional one.51 
However, further research is needed to definitely prove this thesis, and establish which 
identification comes first, V4 or the CEE. The V4 has formed a strong bond over its 
opposition to the EU relocation quotas. They present themselves as an alternative alli-
ance against the old Member States.
Coherence of the positions of the Visegrad Group is noticeable.52
The EU is demonised. Its “old” Member States are portrayed as dangerous, its “Brus-
sels elites” as illegitimate, its leaders as authoritarian, its policies as bad and ineffective 
(the underlined words are those that were coded):
[About accepting and relocating refugees] Attempts to force joint responsibility for 
the decision on the opening of borders, which Angela Merkel has taken in an authoritarian 
manner and in violation of all EU procedures, is a complete mistake of Brussels. The Euro-
pean Union, if it is to be an organization embedded in the values of European culture, must 
first require of itself the rule of law.53
This propaganda about success [of relocation programs] from the European Commis-
sion… for many people it was a wakeup call showing the hypocrisy of the Brussels elites.54
Jarosław Kaczyński on meeting with Merkel, discussing problems of Brexit and ref-
ugees, in document titled “Each state has a sovereign right to defend its interest”:
47 “Brussels Explosions: What We Know about Airport and Metro Attacks”, BBC News, 9 April 2016, 
at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985>.
48 “Paris and Brussels Bombers’ Links Uncovered”, BBC News, 9 April 2016, at <https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-35879401>.
49 E. Prelinger, “Extension and Structure of the Self ”, Journal of Psychology, vol. 47, no. 1 (1959), 
pp. 13-23. 
50 According to Prelinger, who tested James’s concept of extended self, other people, such as the people 
in one’s hometown, are considered as an extension of the self.
51 T. Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, Ithaca, NY 2010.
52 Retrieved from: “Zauważalna jest spójność stanowisk Grupy Wyszehradzkiej”, PiS, 21 June 2018, 
at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/zauwazalna-jest-spojnosc-stanowisk-grupy-wyszehradzkiej>.
53 Retrieved from: “UE od samej siebie musi wymagać praworządności”, PiS, 30 June 2017, at <http://
pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/ue-od-samej-siebie-musi-wymagac-praworzadnosci>.
54 Retrieved from: “KE nie jest głucha na argument Grupy Wyszehradzkiej”, PiS, 29 September 2017, 
at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/ke-nie-jest-glucha-na-argumenty-grupy-wyszehradzkiej>.
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Germany must decide. We do not accept such a policy that on the one hand, all is well 
at the international level, and on the other at the level of media and society, there is a con-
stant nonsensical attack on Poland and supporting the opposition, which is not a normal 
opposition, but a total opposition. This is unacceptable…The claim that the German gov-
ernment does not have any influence over the media is a claim, to put it mildly, detached 
from reality.55
We can notice Kaczynski blaming Germany for being hypocritical, as “Brussels 
elites” in the quote above, and victimizing Poland as being nonsensically attacked. In 
another statement, Kaczynski takes this even further:
[On Poland’s strong anti-migrant stance against the EU] The arguments are raised 
that the European Union pays us. But what is it paying for? For the fact that we give away 
to the strongest states of the European Union (because it is them, and not us, who decides in 
Brussels) a very large part of the decision-making opportunities on our matters. They gain 
great regulatory power, also towards Poland. It has great economic and political value. We 
do not get it for free, we can say that they buy it from us very cheaply… We have no reasons 
for pangs of conscience. Instead, we have the right to defend our sovereignty to oppose the 
unheard-of statements of European politicians, headed by Mr Schulz, to defend against 
this defamation campaign carried out by the mortal enemies of Poland, people mad from 
hatred to our country. And not doing this is not only a disgrace, shame and scandal but also 
a great political mistake.56
This statement is especially harsh, with European politicians being called “mortal 
enemies of Poland”, “mad from hatred”. It stems from September 2015, when a parlia-
mentary campaign was still ongoing. Later communications are more diplomatic.
The EU is perceived as polarized between the West and the East, with Poland as 
a “whipping boy”:
The basic problem of Poland is the fact that in recent months it has become a comfortable 
“whipping boy”. The decision makers of the “old EU”, irritated by Poland’s strong opposition 
to the forced relocation of refugees in our country, imposed on us unfavourable rhetoric in 
their national media, which in turn has a clear impact on sentiments in the society. As a con-
sequence, in the societies of the “old EU” the antipathy to our country persists or is even grow-
ing, as to the alleged “egoists” who “forgot what solidarity is” and who “only take money and 
do not want to give anything themselves”. In this climate, populist simplifications and unfair 
generalizations fall on fertile ground… At the same time, the Polish government should re-
peat the signals of support for European integration while respecting the scope of political and 
economic freedoms guaranteed by the treaties. A strong EU is Poland’s interest – but not the 
EU polarized between the “poor relatives from the East” and the “old elite”.57
55 Retrieved from: “Każde państwo ma suwerenne prawo do obrony swoich interesów”, PiS, 6 February 
2017, at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/kazde-panstwo-ma-suwerenne-prawo-do-obrony-swoich-
interesow>.
56 Retrieved from: “Mamy prawo bronić naszej suwerenności”, PiS, 16 September 2015, at <http://pis.
org.pl/aktualnosci/mamy-prawo-bronic-naszej-suwerennosci>. 
57 Retrieved from: “Europoseł J. Wiśniewska o wyborach prezydenckich we Francji”, PiS, 18 May 2017, 
at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/europosel-j-wisniewska-o-wyborach-prezydenckich-we-francji>.
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At the same time, they contradistinguish Western Europe from Central and Eastern 
Europe, and not in a flattering manner:
Please look around Europe, look at Sweden, where Sharia is in force and the state has 
no control. (…) What is happening in Italy? Occupied churches, sometimes treated as toi-
lets. What is going on in France? A constant wrangle and patrols that enforce sharia. The 
same happens in London, also in Germany, the toughest in this respect, such phenomena 
take place.58
…by [not]59 accepting the forced relocation of migrants, we win the security of our own 
citizens. People in Poland, in public places, feel safe. At least a lot safer than in Western 
Europe. They do not live in fear that every night out on the beach or an evening walk can 
end in a tragedy.60
Many curious observations can be made about those paragraphs. First, as normally 
in their discourse, PiS presents EU relocation quotas (as many other EU decisions) as 
forced on Poland.
In general, we can notice how this paragraph’s aim is to incite fear by means of 
highly dramatic language (“living in fear”, “can end in tragedy”) and a comparison with 
a Western Europe which has accepted refugees and is therefore implicitly suffering 
from terror.
We show that you can pursue a different policy and live without fear of terrorist attacks. 
This is an example for the leaders of some countries that are so dangerous, that regardless of 
the invocation of reality, the frustration of societies affected by these misfortunes is growing. 
They look at the map and see where it is different. And they ask – how come can they live 
there normally? In the name of what do we give away our security, the shape of European 
civilization? I often hear such voices… I hear admiration for Poland that was able to say 
“no” to bad projects, that we are today a beautiful, safe, attractive country.61
This paragraph is an excellent example of myth. The mere refusal to accept a few 
thousand refugees only two years before the publication of this material, is interpreted 
with so much meaning that it is basically portrayed as the cause of the country’s pros-
perity. On the other hand, other [implicitly Western] European countries are portrayed 
as dangerous and self-destructive. Poland is yet again shown as the hero, the Messiah, 
who will show others the way to salvation. Empirical reality is explicitly denied.
Besides, in many cases, the word ‘migrants’ is used when clearly ‘refugees’ or ‘asy-
lum seekers’ is meant. I believe this is intentional and not just an accidental confusion 
of definitions. That is because ‘migrant’ unlike ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’ frees them 
from implied responsibility to help. At the same time, while talking about Ukrainians 
in Poland, they often use the term ‘refugee’, even though the vast majority of them are 
58 Retrieved from: “Mamy prawo bronić…”
59 I assume there was a typo, as the interviewee talks about Poland refusing to accept refugees and the 
benefits of such a decision.
60 Retrieved from: “Nie będzie zgody na przymusową relokację uchodźców”, PiS, 4 September 2017, at 
<http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/nie-bedzie-zgody-na-przymusowa-relokacje-uchodzcow>.
61 Retrieved from: ibid.
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economic migrants.62 Moreover, it is often said that refugees in Europe are not real ref-
ugees, that they are liars seeking economic profit – this logic also frees one from sympa-
thy and responsibility to help:
We see that refugees come not only from Syria or Iraq. They are people there from north-
ern Africa or even from Europe. What is very important is that these people want to go to 
Germany.63
Another example of emphasizing security – in a document titled “Security of Poles 
is our priority”64 the first sentence reads:
Prime Minister Beata Szydło has firmly stated today that in the matter of refugees, Po-
land will not allow itself to be intimidated by the European Commission. The security of 
the region, Poles and the Visegrad Group is our priority and we will never agree to black-
mail and dictating such conditions.65
A lot is being said on the EU’s intention to fine Member States who refuse to relo-
cate refugees:
The fee would amount to 250,000 euro for each person who will not be accepted […] 
This is a form of extortion on EU states that are not ready to receive.66
We can notice here the emotional appeal to a Polish messianic complex and distrust 
for authority. The latter is manifested in the language of oppression used to describe 
the actions of the European commission: intimidation, blackmail, dictating, distortion. 
The former is reminiscent of the structure of the myth of Poland as “Christ of nations” 
(a notion first introduced by Adam Mickiewicz)67 where not only Poland is oppressed 
by a foreign power, it stands firmly against it, and their sacrifice is supposed to save the 
entire region from suffering.
Another example of Poland under PiS represented as a hero in the good fight:
As Poland, from the very beginning we have consistently and with great courage raised 
it and we were not afraid to start discussions on this subject [the relocation mechanism]. 
The entire Visegrad is of such opinion at the moment.68
As long as I am Prime Minister, there will be no Polish consent to this [refugee reloca-
tion]. They [the EU] will not break us.69
Across all the publications, sovereignty is mentioned or alluded to multiple times in 
regard to migration policy. It seems to be that this is the real issue for PiS, not refugees 
62 “Poland Refuses…”
63 Retrieved from: “Najważniejsze jest bezpieczeństwo”.
64 Retrieved from: “Bezpieczeństwo Polaków jest dla nas priorytetem”, PiS, 28 March 2017, at <http://
pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/bezpieczenstwo-polakow-jest-dla-nas-priorytetem>.
65 Retrieved from: ibid.
66 Retrieved from: “Nie zgadzamy się z decyzją KE”, PiS,5 May 2016, at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/
nie-zgadzamy-sie-z-decyzja-ke>.
67 A. Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism. The Case of Poland, Oxford 1982.
68 Retrieved from: “Nasze działania ws. imigrantów sprawdzają się i przynoszą rezultaty”, PiS, 20 May 
2017, at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/nasze-dzialania-ws-imigrantow-sprawdzaja-sie-i-przynosza-
rezultaty>.
69 Retrieved from: “Nie będzie zgody…”
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per se, but rather their monopoly on decision-making in Poland being jeopardized by 
the EU. Since Poland’s history of occupations has led it, along with other countries in 
the region, to perceive its sovereignty as sacrosanct70, this issue is easy to manipulate in 
order to mobilize opposition against the foreign power that is claimed to be a threat to 
nation’s sovereignty:
Such a decision would abolish the sovereignty of the weaker Member States of the Euro-
pean Union. We cannot agree to this. We must oppose, because we are and will be masters 
in our own land.71
Sovereign states must have the ability to decide who they accept.72
We have the right to defend our sovereignty.73
We take the position that all EU countries have a duty to guarantee full sovereignty of 
borders and that we, the Republic of Poland, decide who we want to accept, whom we want 
to accept temporarily, and whom we do not want to accept.74
The talk of “weaker” Member States seems to be an instrumental victimization, in 
other contexts it is often talked about how strong the Polish economy is. When asked 
whether she thinks that “the European Establishment” will accept the changes in Po-
land [refusal to relocate refugees] former Prime Minister Beata Szydło replied:
I’m convinced of that. It is impossible to leave Poland, a large country, one of the leaders, 
when it comes to economic growth in Europe, out of decision-making. Neither we, nor other 
Member States will allow this. It does not change the fact that we will be attacked. We must 
remind them that it is about our example, our path, how to build economic growth, security 
of citizens, an attractive place to invest, that it does not infect others with the thought that 
things can be done differently than before.75
The growing political influence of the V4 is also mentioned in other articles:
V4 is becoming an increasingly serious European entity that can create a positive and 
constructive European policy, can indicate positive solutions. […] The Polish Presidency in 
the V4 will coincide with the Presidency of Slovakia in the EU Council – it is a good time 
to talk about Central Europe, to show our projects and build a good climate for them in the 
European Union.76
From an article titled Poland defends its own interests today:
For us the most important is the security of Poles. We will not agree to the forced reloca-
tion of refugees. Nobody can impose a migration policy on us, it is an individual matter of 
70 M. Góra, Z. Mach (eds.), Collective Identity and Democracy. The Impact of EU Enlargement, Oslo 
2010.
71 Retrieved from: “Q&A z Prezesem PiS…”
72 Retrieved from: “Wspólnie możemy wpłynąć na losy Europy”, PiS, 3 January 2018, at <http://pis.org.
pl/aktualnosci/wspolnie-mozemy-wplynac-na-losy-europy>.
73 Retrieved from: “Mamy prawo bronić…”
74 Retrieved from: “Za nami udany szczyt UE – Bałkany Zachodnie”, PiS, 17 May 2018, at <http://pis.
org.pl/aktualnosci/za-nami-udany-szczyt-ue-balkany-zachodnie>.
75 Retrieved from: “Nie będzie zgody…”
76 Retrieved from: “To było dobre spotkanie przyjaciół”, PiS, 8 April 2016, at <http://pis.org.pl/aktual-
nosci/to-bylo-dobre-spotkanie-przyjaciol>.
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each of the EU member states…Currently, the policy of pressure from the European Union 
is being applied. We cannot give in to it.77
The narrative of saving Poland from a security threat and protecting it from a for-
eign bully demonstrates that PiS has resorted to messianic politics.78 The perceived sal-
vation of the nation from all evil foreign threats, PiS fully accredits to itself:
If it were not for the Government of Law and Justice and a tough policy in this matter, 
the Poles would not feel safe today.79
Here we can also notice again the language of emotions in “feeling safe”, but not 
necessarily being safe, as empirical reality is secondary when it comes to myth. More-
over, this example clearly shows the construction of a mythical hero or protagonist 
(a major characteristic of political myth after Tudor) out of the PiS government. This 
is constructed in opposition not only to the EU, as the antagonist, but also towards 
Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), the opposition party. Hence, we see the 
manifestation of another myth being created about PO, that of ‘the enemy of the peo-
ple’.. The above quote comes from an article titled Civic Platform has no direction for 
Poland,80 referring to their decision to accept EU relocation quotas when they were in 
government Against the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, against the V4 coun-
tries.81 PO is shown as unable to defend the Polish interest against the EU:
PO is not a party that would be able to conduct a sovereign migration policy and a sov-
ereign policy towards the EU, to present Polish arguments in Brussels.82
Often ‘the enemy of the people’ is personalised in the face of Donald Tusk, the 
leader of PO and President of the European Council. One document was even titled: 
“Donald Tusk is convenient for Western European countries”83, which implies that 
there is a conflict of interest between Western and Eastern Member States and not 
a common European interest. A zero-sum game, not a positive-sum game. Therefore, 
Tusk is seen as a traitor. The first sentence of that article mentions refugees:
Donald Tusk already in September 2015 spoke very clearly in favour of forced refugee 
quotas for the EU Member States, including Poland. …the candidacy of Donald Tusk is 
convenient from the point of view of Western countries that want to get rid of immigrants… 
He behaved as if he was a very loyal functionary of the European Union, who pursues Ger-
man interests. Chancellor Merkel is now pushing Donald’s candidacy…84
77 Retrieved from: “Polska broni dzisiaj własnych interesów”, PiS, 24 August 2017, at <http://pis.org.pl/
aktualnosci/polska-broni-dzisiaj-wlasnych-interesow>.
78 J.P. Zúquete, “Missionary Politics…”




82 Retrieved from: “Nasze działania ws. imigrantów…”
83 Retrieved from: “Donald Tusk jest wygodny dla krajów Zachodniej Europy”, PiS, 9 March 2017, at 
<http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/donald-tusk-jest-wygodny-dla-krajow-zachodniej-europy>.
84 Ibid.
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Kaczynski went as far as to call Tusk’s actions “high treason”:
High treason is a legal concept that refers to the most serious crime that can be commit-
ted. But, gentlemen, it is necessary to recall what Donald Tusk has done with the idea of 
punishing countries opposing the admission of refugees with the fine of 250,000 euros per 
person.85
His actions are seeing as singling out the Polish and Hungarian governments: as the 
head of this body [the European Council], he does not focus on solving the migration prob-
lem, but on the fighting the Polish government and the Hungarian government.86
Moreover, everybody who is not with us, is against us, against Poland. They do 
not just have different values and political beliefs, they have evil intentions. In mat-
ters of existential security, there is no room for tolerance, and every harsh decision is 
justified as necessary for the survival of the nation. This is where the danger of secu-
ritized issues lies:
That’s those who march today [in support of welcoming refugees], who want the Pol-
ish life to be disturbed.87
Importantly, in later publications, we can see that the good fight that PiS has been 
carrying on has started to bear fruit. The European institutions have started listening 
to what Poland has to say and accepting it. The need for acceptance has been fulfilled, 
and Poland has managed to convert other countries to its side in the argument, saving 
both them and us:
The fact that the decision to relocate immigrants has not been extended, but is dying a nat-
ural death, is for Poland above all a sign that the European Commission is not deaf to the ar-
guments of the Visegrad Group. Patiently repeated arguments brought the expected results.88
A publication titled “Together, we can influence the fate of Europe”, mentions that 
Poland contributes to easing migration tensions visibly.89
I am glad that the President of the European Council is starting to speak like Poland 
in the context of refugees. We want to help people affected by the war on the spot, there the 
help is more effective.90
PiS’s need for acceptance by the EU is manifested strongly, it can also be concluded 
from this as well as frequent mentions of sovereignty that PiS opposes deeper European 
integration:
For the future of the EU the most important is another foundation of European inte-
gration, which is not much talked about lately – the motto of the EU is the slogan “united 
in diversity”. It would be very good if the Brussels elites realized that the Member States are 
85 Retrieved from: “Sądownictwo powinno być radykalnie zmienione”, PiS, 17 March 2017, at <http://
pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/sadownictwo-powinno-byc-radykalnie-zmienione>.
86 Retrieved from: “Nasze działania ws. imigrantów…”
87 Retrieved from: “Q&A z Prezesem PiS…”
88 Retrieved from: “KE nie jest głucha na argument…”
89 Retrieved from: “Wspólnie możemy wpłynąć…”
90 Retrieved from: “UE musi sprawiedliwie traktować swoje kraje członkowskie”, PiS, 14 December 2017, 
at <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/ue-musi-sprawiedliwie-traktowac-swoje-kraje-czlonkowskie>.
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different, and this in turn implies different options for action in emergency situations, such 
as the current migration crisis. The EU should unambiguously accept the diverse efforts of 
various Member States to stop a humanitarian catastrophe.91
As for helping people on the spot, this seems to be the alternative vision of the 
concept of solidarity that PiS conveys everywhere in its discourse as proof of its good 
intentions:
We want to help, but there on the spot.92
We owe the truth to those who died in Auschwitz…Referring to the situation in the 
Middle East, she reminded that people in a war-torn country need to be helped but on the 
spot…You have to create a decent living environment for them. The current European Un-
ion policy towards refugees is not effective…We wonder if this is the way that will really help 
refugees, if it is not better – as Poland is doing right now – to help there on the spot, like 
when we get involved providing medical help …our country is involved, among others in the 
construction of hospitals.93
Invoking Auschwitz, when it has nothing to do with the matter discussed, is a clear 
manipulation, aimed at revoking historical memory and strong emotions.
ConClUSIon
The analysis has shown an overwhelming appeal to emotion, and very little appeal to 
rationality throughout the discourse.
The basic mythical structure identified in the texts analysed is the ‘us vs. them’ myth. 
‘Us’ represents PiS and Poland, which are constructed as heroes, and sometimes the V4 
or the CEE in general. Heroization of a particular group is central to political myth 
(after Tudor). ‘Them’ is more diverse. First, on a vertical axis, it refers to the EU, “the 
old EU” Member States, especially Germany and the so-called “Brussels elites”, who are 
demonized and constructed into an antagonist, a usurper, a hater. On a horizontal axis 
there is the ‘other’, a foreign enemy, refugees, which are constructed into an existential 
security threat. This triad of people-elite-enemy is distinctive of right-wing populism.94 
Another enemy constructed in PiS’s discourse is the PO, and Donald Tusk in particu-
lar. Their portrayal resembles the ‘enemy of the people’ myth, as in their stances on mi-
gration policy they have allegedly betrayed the Polish interest. Overall, we can see that 
PiS views migration policy as a zero-sum game, where Western EU Member States ben-
efit from relocating refugees, putting the burden on the Eastern Member States, who 
are unable to handle it. By refusing refugee relocation quotas, PiS promises salvation 
91 Retrieved from: “UE od samej siebie…”
92 Retrieved from: “Q&A z Prezesem PiS…”
93 Retrieved from: “Polityka migracyjna UE nie przynosi efektów”, PiS, 19 June 2017, at <http://pis.org.
pl/aktualnosci/polityka-migracyjna-ue-nie-przynosi-efektow>.
94 R. Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Com-
parative Perspective”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 40, no. 8 (2017), pp. 1191-1226. 
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from this threat, from all the enemies – resorting to missionary politics. It also conveys 
an alternative way of helping refugees and showing solidarity – through providing aid 
at home, in their sending countries. All of this, coupled with occasional references to 
European civilization and values, suggests that the PiS vision of European identity is 
rather inward-looking, meaning that it is culture and value-based, and not universalist 
and open-ended. However, this thesis would need to be further researched.
Overall, this paper is based on a relatively small research sample. PiS discourse, 
beyond what is available on its website and beyond only text, needs to be further re-
searched in order to definitively prove the indicative conclusions drawn above. How-
ever, this paper could serve as an illustration and as a point of departure for deeper in-
vestigations into how PiS uses mythological structures, and how their visions of Europe 
and of European identity manifest themselves in migration discourse.
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